It is hard to judge such things from a distance, but the Pakistani reaction this time feels qualitatively different from the crises preceding it over the past few months, from January's Raymond Davis affair, to May's Abbottabad raid on bin Laden, to September's public accusations of Pakistani perfidy from the outgoing US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One has the sense that a political and psychological barrier has been broken, and that even if the outward forms of cooperation and civility are restored, and the border crossings for NATO supplies into Afghanistan are reopened, things will not be the same for a very long time.
Observers far closer to the action than me say there is little chance of an outright break in relations. They are probably right. But while the situation may not become so obviously dramatic, the inner reality of US-Pakistan relations is likely to be so insidiously bitter and caustic as to preclude any real co-operation on anything touching regional security and stability.
We have seen this picture before. During the 1990s, finding itself heavily sanctioned by the Americans for pursuing what it felt were core national security interests in countering a nuclear-capable India, Pakistan came un-tethered from the international security and non-proliferation regime which the US was trying to promote. Denied other means, and believing that the US-led international framework was working against its interests, Pakistan was willing to deal with rogue states to acquire what it felt it needed.
Should Pakistan again feel that it has no core stake in co-operative relations with the US and the West, if it should conclude, in fact, that the US is undermining Pakistan's national security interests, there is no end of mischief which could arise, both in the immediate South Asian region, and much further afield. Difficulties in Afghanistan would only be the beginning. The notion of Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons state seeking other sources of aid and countervailing strategic alliances to oppose a perceived Washington-Kabul-New Delhi axis is one that should give the US considerable pause.
It is time for the US to get serious. The unintended consequences of its grossly disproportionate engagement in Afghanistan are simply becoming unbearable. With a much smaller presence and a sustainable policy, the United States can protect its core counter-terrorism interests in Afghanistan, and do so without further contributing to the international alienation and domestic unravelling of its far more important neighbour to the east.
The United States has some fundamental choices to make in South Asia, and they will not be easy. The US may be on a glide path to a proportionate and sustainable presence in Afghanistan, but the two years between now and 2014 is longer than anyone can afford to wait. The US is hoping that during those two years it can achieve through a political settlement something close to the maximal goals that force of arms could not, and it expects Pakistan to help deliver it. These are not only vain hopes, but ones whose stubborn pursuit threatens disastrous consequences.
Pakistan is, at best, a maddening and frustrating ally. Its combination of poor leadership and social and political weakness make it far more capable of harming US interests than of constructively contributing to them. But the current course is leading to disaster. In the end, by any objective measure, the US has far more at stake in Pakistan than it does in Afghanistan. This is the central, organising policy principle which Washington must grasp, before it is too late.
Robert L. Grenier -chairman of ERG Partners
Observers far closer to the action than me say there is little chance of an outright break in relations. They are probably right. But while the situation may not become so obviously dramatic, the inner reality of US-Pakistan relations is likely to be so insidiously bitter and caustic as to preclude any real co-operation on anything touching regional security and stability.
We have seen this picture before. During the 1990s, finding itself heavily sanctioned by the Americans for pursuing what it felt were core national security interests in countering a nuclear-capable India, Pakistan came un-tethered from the international security and non-proliferation regime which the US was trying to promote. Denied other means, and believing that the US-led international framework was working against its interests, Pakistan was willing to deal with rogue states to acquire what it felt it needed.
Should Pakistan again feel that it has no core stake in co-operative relations with the US and the West, if it should conclude, in fact, that the US is undermining Pakistan's national security interests, there is no end of mischief which could arise, both in the immediate South Asian region, and much further afield. Difficulties in Afghanistan would only be the beginning. The notion of Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons state seeking other sources of aid and countervailing strategic alliances to oppose a perceived Washington-Kabul-New Delhi axis is one that should give the US considerable pause.
It is time for the US to get serious. The unintended consequences of its grossly disproportionate engagement in Afghanistan are simply becoming unbearable. With a much smaller presence and a sustainable policy, the United States can protect its core counter-terrorism interests in Afghanistan, and do so without further contributing to the international alienation and domestic unravelling of its far more important neighbour to the east.
The United States has some fundamental choices to make in South Asia, and they will not be easy. The US may be on a glide path to a proportionate and sustainable presence in Afghanistan, but the two years between now and 2014 is longer than anyone can afford to wait. The US is hoping that during those two years it can achieve through a political settlement something close to the maximal goals that force of arms could not, and it expects Pakistan to help deliver it. These are not only vain hopes, but ones whose stubborn pursuit threatens disastrous consequences.
Pakistan is, at best, a maddening and frustrating ally. Its combination of poor leadership and social and political weakness make it far more capable of harming US interests than of constructively contributing to them. But the current course is leading to disaster. In the end, by any objective measure, the US has far more at stake in Pakistan than it does in Afghanistan. This is the central, organising policy principle which Washington must grasp, before it is too late.
Robert L. Grenier -chairman of ERG Partners
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